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Decisions at the data border: discretion, discernment and security 
Abstract 
Amidst a widespread turn to data analysis and automated screening in security contexts, the question 
of how decisions are made at the interface of embodied humans and algorithmic processes becomes 
pressing. This paper is concerned with the production of security decisions at the data border. It 
makes two contributions. First, it presents qualitative fieldwork amongst data processors at a 
European smart border targeting centre and, second, it traces a largely obscured cultural history of 
discretion as means of reflecting on the politics of contemporary data-led decision-making. Discretion 
is an important concept in contemporary administrative contexts, referring to a decision about the 
(non)application of a rule in contexts of public power and authority. Its etymon, discretio, however, 
referred historically to spiritual and visual discernment, as well as prudence and humility. I present 
the history of discretion to make two arguments:  1) decision-making at the data border is an 
uncertain visual practice oriented to seeing and authorising what is there and 2) discretion in 
contemporary data-led contexts revises the conventional ethical relationship between general and 
particular that has always been intrinsic to discretion.  My overall point is that contemporary debates 
about judgement in automated security decisions are the most recent manifestation of long-standing 
tensions between rule and judgement, authorisation and uncertainty. 
 
Introduction 
Data analysis appears to solve a key problem of contemporary border security: how best to 
target risky people while expediting licit flows? Border screening programmes (such as 
Passenger Name Record systems in Europe and the United States Automated Targeting 
System) subject passenger data to matching and profiling techniques in order to pre-check 
and risk score travellers. The turn to data in border security has fuelled interdisciplinary 
debate about the wider politics of pre-emption and governing by risk (Amoore 2013; 
Amoore and de Goede 2008) and has also raised concerns about discrimination, privacy and 
data protection (see, for instance, Korff 2015).  A prominent question within the burgeoning 
literature is how, precisely, decisions about immigration and security are authorised. One 
response has been to reconsider the work of immigration, customs and border security 
agents. These agents are understood to exercise considerable discretionary power in the 
(non)enforcement of law and policy, and their everyday decisions have been widely 
construed as performing and constituting the contemporary border (Heyman 2009; 
Makaremi 2010; Pratt 2005; Hall 2012). New technologies, however, are reconfiguring border 
agents’ work. More specifically, when data-led screening and risk profiling at the border 
appear to automate decisions about who to stop, question, and investigate, there are 
complex shifts in the enactment and meaning of discretion (see Côté-Boucher 2016; Kalman 
2015).  
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This paper focuses on discretion at the contemporary data border. I am concerned with the 
way in which algorithmic analyses are transforming ‘the decision’ in immigration and 
security controls. I build on recent studies that have described border security as practice 
(see Côté-Boucher et al 2014), and I also draw from the wider interdisciplinary literature on 
data and technologies in public life.  Key within this wider literature is the idea that 
algorithms have a growing (but little understood) power in contemporary social, cultural, 
political and economic life (e.g. Steiner 2012, Ziewitz 2015). Prominent also is the post-
human understanding of human activity to be fully entangled with technologies of all kinds, 
with ramifications for conventional ideas of decision, accountability, even liability. This is 
particularly important, given the ubiquitous invocation by border security authorities of 
what Hayles (1999) terms the ‘liberal humanist subject’ - whose decisions and actions are 
wholly separable from technological systems. So, for instance, the US Automated Targeting 
System is defended because (it is claimed) it is a “decision-support tool” that “enables 
decisions” that are “better informed” but it is still a human who decides (Heyman 2011). 
I agree with Aradau and Blanke (2015: 5) when they note a depoliticizing tendency in the 
authorities’ insistence on the strong separation of humans and technologies in the governing 
of security, and the tendency of critical social science to downplay the “division of labour 
between humans and computers” (ibid.) in the rise of digital technologies. My approach is 
one that takes seriously the performative power of technological processes, but which resists 
re-instating (or making redundant) the human, or resorting to techno-determinism. First, I 
present qualitative fieldwork among data processors in a European border targeting centre 
who are responsible for checking automated security matches. My concern is to understand 
the production of decisions at the smart border: How are subjects of interest identified and 
eliminated? How are algorithmic processes authorised at the interface of embodied humans 
and algorithmic processes? What is the division of labour at this particular security site?  
Second, I seek to gain critical traction on the contemporary politics of data and border 
security via an expanded consideration of discretion. Discretion is a central concept in law 
and policy, referring in our times to a decision about the (non)application of a rule in 
contexts of public power. It combines meanings of authority and freedom to decide (there 
are also secondary connotations of confidentiality and secrecy). Discretion is, inevitably, 
bound up with Hayles’ liberal humanist subject (1999: 287) – with spaces of apparent 
freedom and choice in the modern rule-bound bureaucratic administration of law and 
policy. Discretion, however, has a complex history. Literatures in the humanities and arts 
collectively document a tangled cultural genealogy in western thought, and it is to this 
genealogy that I turn. Discretion, it transpires, shares a history with discernment. Both have 
their roots in the Greek term diakrisis, and its Latin translation, discretio, which originally 
meant separation or discrimination, as well as judgement (Rich 2007: xxiiv). It is not entirely 
new to note that discretion and discernment have a common history (see, for instance, 
Kleinig 1996: 82) and in one sense it is somewhat obvious – their modern meanings clearly 
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overlap in the idea of exercising good judgement, for instance. What has been underplayed, 
however, is how discretio has historically been a site for exploring ambiguities regarding the 
human senses, particularly vision, and the difficulty of judging truth in uncertain contexts. 
Restoring historical depth to the idea of discretion will allow me to argue that contemporary 
debates about algorithms, judgement and security decisions are not wholly novel. They are, 
instead, the most recent manifestation of long-standing tensions between rule and 
judgement, deference and freedom, authorisation and uncertainty.  
The discussion proceeds in four parts. First, I briefly outline the ‘problem’ of discretion, and 
introduce the data targeting centre where I conducted fieldwork. Second, I present a brief 
history of discretio spirituum, discernment of spirits, which was for centuries a key problem 
in Christian theology. Put briefly, discretio (from which our modern discretion comes) 
referred to the ability to distinguish true and false spiritual visions. However, seeing what is 
there and authorising the visual were rife with problems. I will indicate how these issues 
unfolded, became lodged within modern ideas about discretion and describe the 
implications for contemporary data-led security decisions. Third, I chart the shifting 
historical relationship between discretio and the rule, drawing on Foucault and Agamben. 
Modern thought, Daston (2017) argues, tends to “oppose rules to some other elusive 
desideratum, such as interpretation, judgment, creativity, discretion, or simple common 
sense”, but rules were not always imagined as opposed to discretion. While the 
contemporary concern with the reach of algorithmic rules is quite specific to our times, the 
search for a rule through which truth might be discerned is not. Finally, I conclude by 
demonstrating how the contemporary politics of border targeting can be illuminated by 
viewing automated processes as a particular resolution to the gap between what we think 
we see and know – features that have long been part of the history of discretion.  
 
Discretion and the data border 
The European smart border targeting centre where my fieldwork took place is an open-plan 
multi-agency centre including police, immigration and customs staff. It operates 24 hours a 
day, 365 days of the year. The centre’s remit is to screen passenger data from airlines and to 
alert ports of entry about subjects of interest. I interviewed 25 processors who work with 
automated systems and the immigration, police and security databases. These systems use 
algorithms to match travellers to immigration, terrorist and criminal watchlists, using 
personal identity information from passports and visas (what is known as advance 
passenger information, API). The interviews I conducted were voluntary and took place 
during work time within the centre. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, and it 
was a criterion of my fieldwork that the centre’s identity was protected. Participant 
observation was precluded because of the sensitive security context. Interviews were 
informal and loosely structured, with participants being invited to discuss their experience 
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of work with the automated systems and of decision making around the matches.  The work 
of the basic level processor as they described it is this: he or she accesses a list of potential 
watchlist ‘hits’ generated by the system. The processor must decide whether the passenger 
en route is genuinely a match for the watchlist subject, by referring to visa, passport and 
other data as necessary. If the hit is verified, the relevant data is checked by a senior 
colleague and if the passenger is positively identified as a watchlist match, an alert is issued 
to the frontline authorities.  
The watchlist matching is coupled with what processors referred to as rules-based targeting, 
largely based on Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. The PNR is a commercial dataset 
generated by the airline industry. It may include credit card and ticketing details, travel 
agent information, frequent flyer data, email addresses, travel companions and itineraries. 
Whereas the API matches, put simply, are concerned with identifying known suspects before 
they travel (Is this passenger wanted by the police? Is she on a terrorist watchlist?), rules-
based targeting identifies potentially risky subjects not yet known to the authorities. 
According to the security authorities, PNR contains data from which ‘aspects of the 
passenger’s history, conduct and behaviour can be deduced’ (House of Lords 2007: 9). New 
passenger data is run against established risk profiles (e.g. common drug trafficking routes, 
indicators associated with human trafficking) to reveal new subjects of interest. In these 
cases, the data processor must similarly verify and refer onwards the automated matches.  
For its advocates, data matching and targeting uses incontrovertible digital traces (credit 
card transactions, travel histories) to target threat rather than potentially discriminatory 
profiles or subjective judgements based on appearance or background. The apparent 
objectivity of data as a means of targeting passengers was often noted by the processors:  
I think the use of data and watch lists is being used to objectify the decision making 
process for the very good reason that, certainly from an immigration point of view, 
decisions which are subjective or arbitrary or capricious or are inconsistent are not 
something that we should be paying civil servants to take. In a democracy we 
shouldn't be having officials taking contradictory, capricious, or skewed decisions.  
So there is a kind of a cross-party desire to objectify the decision making process 
[and] databases are absolutely ideal (Interview 1) 
However, the processors simultaneously saw their ‘judgement calls’ about matches to be 
important.  
Well, it [targeting] can only be used to support human decisions. I don't think you 
can say well, I don't like the look of this passenger's travel history just from the data. 
Why is he flying Nairobi to London, London to Dubai on a regular basis?  Why isn't 
he going Nairobi-Dubai, what's he up to?  The guy could say, well I've got very 
narrow margins, it's cheaper to do it that way. Erm, it [data] can only be used to 
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support a decision I think, and if you rely on data too much, to the exclusion of the 
human element, you're going to be in a bit of trouble (Interview 2). 
The processors, then, held an ambivalent view of their decision-making. This ambivalence 
emerged during the interviews, during which many people complained about the centre’s 
strict organisational hierarchies and the protocols surrounding the data. More specifically, 
processors who had previously worked as frontline immigration or customs officers often 
noted a lack of discretionary power in their work with the data: “you're not making life and 
death decisions [here], you're not deciding, do we detain that person, do we refuse them 
leave to enter?” (Interview 3). As one woman put it:  
There would be circumstances [in my previous role], where you could use your own 
discretion…  [There were times when] I've not detained somebody and I gave them 
the option to go and remove themselves, so to speak. That's a judgement call you 
make at the time (Interview 4)  
In contrast to “life or death” discretionary decisions of conventional border work, processors 
understood their choices about automated hits to be part of an assemblage of security, where 
the generation of immigration or security alerts emerged from dispersed decision-making 
across various technological and human interventions. One of the senior processors told me 
that junior colleagues “shouldn’t actually be taking decisions at all. I think the level of 
discretion is right for each grade” (Interview 5). Basic-level analysts were supposed to pass 
potential hits to senior processors for review. The senior processor, in turn, would pass the 
alert on to the port authorities:  
They [frontline authorities] decide whether the information that we've given them 
warrants further investigation. So, even as a [senior processor], I'm not making a 
decision, I'm giving somebody else [my] decision for them to make a decision. I’m 
setting that out to make someone else make a further decision (Interview 6)   
What is clear from the interviews is that the data processors’ understanding of ‘true’ 
discretion – as potentially arbitrary yet necessary, as a choice about the (non)invocation of a 
rule or law, as an individualised “judgement call” – mirrors almost exactly the conventional 
account.    
Discretion, put simply, is “when an official is empowered to exercise public authority and 
afforded scope to decide how that authority should be exercised in particular 
circumstances” (Pratt and Sossin 2009: 301). Discretion refers to the exercise of good 
judgement, and to the authority of public officials (granted through position and expertise) 
to (not) apply a rule or policy (Kleinig 1996: 82 LaFave 2006). Discretion is considered 
inevitable within legal and administrative contexts because the contextual application of 
legal or policy rules is a “process by which abstraction becomes actuality” (Hawkins 1992: 
11). It is the combination of authority and the freedom to interpret that makes discretion “a 
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political issue, not simply a legal one” (Pratt and Sossin 2009). The large interdisciplinary 
literature on the subject attests to the idea that it is via the discretionary decisions of public 
officials (from immigration officers to judges) that any legal or administrative system 
distributes its burdens and benefits (Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003: 1; see also Pratt 2005; 
Lipsky 1980).  
Moreover, this literature conventionally posits that (legal or policy) rules and discretion are 
distinct, negatively-correlated entities (Pratt 2005: 54-5). There are several ideas contained 
within this ‘zero-sum’ account. First, that law is the primary instrument of social regulation, 
with discretion as a residual “space between legal rules” where actors make choices (Pratt 
2005: 53). Second, that discretion is exercised by essentially free, rational and autonomous 
decision-makers, although of course these decision-makers are influenced by many political, 
economic, social and organisational forces (Hawkins 1993: 15, 38). These pervasive 
assumptions cast discretion as both a problem and a solution.  On one hand, discretion 
appears subjective and arbitrary – the antithesis of the liberal rule of law – raising concerns 
about inconsistency and injustice (Pratt 2005: 69-70). On the other hand, discretion is viewed 
as an ethical and ‘humanising’ device allowing the abstract rules of law and policy to be 
justly applied to individual cases (see Sossin 1994).  
Discretion has been considered particularly problematic at borders. If “border policing 
facilitates potent forms of exclusion and generally does so without accountability 
mechanisms” it is largely because border agents are understood to wield significant 
discretionary powers (Côté-Boucher 2016: 50). In this sense, the decisions of border agents 
epitomise discretion as the lawless “space between rules” (Hawkins 1992: 11). Heyman 
(2009: 367), however, argues that discretion should not be seen as a “formless domain of 
uncontrolled action but, rather, an analysable domain of patterned actions”; discretion is an 
important form of “non-action” (Heyman 2009). Moreover, studies of wider law 
enforcement contexts have demonstrated the multiplicity of “rules” within police work, and 
how they are selectively deployed (or ignored) to “creatively to accomplish desired 
outcomes” (Ericson 2007: 394). Studies like these go some way to troubling any binary 
opposition between rule and discretion. Moreover, recent work has highlighted the way that 
border technologies are curtailing traditional discretionary practices (Côté-Boucher 2016) 
but also facilitating their creative reframing (Kalman 2015).  
In the discussion that follows, I see discretion as neither the opposite of rule, nor the space 
where rational individuals exercise judgement already constituted. I follow Pratt (2005), who 
argues that we should interrogate the idea of discretion as ‘law’s rival’ within the discourse 
of liberal legality. If, after Foucault, liberalism is a political rationality, a broad historical 
discourse that “rationalises and systematises specific governmental programmes and 
policies for the ordering of social life in particular historically specific ways” (Pratt 2005: 15), 
then liberal legality is a “metanarrative” that construes law in terms of universal principles 
grounded in reason. The rule of law, in this line of thinking, is one of many intersecting 
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modes of regulation within the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1982). Administrative 
discretion is a governmental technology that carves out a domain of freedom to 
accommodate the contradiction between universality and particularity within liberal law 
(Pratt 2005: 16). Discretion is a means of governing itself, materialising within historically 
specific discursive formations. The question becomes – and this is important for the 
subsequent discussion – how do rule and discretion mutually constitute one another within 
a situated decision, and with what effects? 
When some ex-immigration officers at the targeting centre described a lack of discretion in 
their new work, they were doubtless noting what Côté-Boucher (2016: 64) describes as the 
“shift in the distribution of decision-making capabilities in border policing” brought by 
technological change. Nonetheless, all the processors spoke in their interviews about using 
their intuition, experience and knowledge to eliminate matches or ‘enrich’ the hits in their 
everyday work with the data and automated system:  
I had one today, Mohammed Ali, born 1990, born the 1/1. But you get loads of 
Somalians, you see hoards of them 1/1. They’re not worried about birthdays, like we 
do, so they just get categorised by the year. So I had one this morning where it was a 
Mohammed Ali born 1/1/1990. And the person on the watchlist was Afghan, and the 
person on the flight to Northern Iraq has the same name and the same birthday. But I 
knew it wasn’t the same person because I knew than an Afghan wouldn’t want to go 
to Northern Iraq, so I discounted it because it was a name like Mohammed, with a 
DOB – there are literally thousands of them. So I took the decision that it wasn’t the 
same person (Interview 7) 
The point here is that the processors’ work with the automated matches always involves a 
specific judgement – and this is discretion. These discretionary judgements, and their 
relationship to the algorithmic rules through which security and immigration are 
increasingly being governed, warrant close attention. The application of intuition and 
knowledge to eliminate or verify a match exceeds the idea of an agent who assumes that 
“automated decision making systems are infallible” (Korff 2015: 29). My fieldwork also 
troubles the idea of the sovereign human agent whose decisions are simply enabled by the 
technologies. In the next section, I develop the idea of discretion as discernment to argue that 
automated security practice and its discretionary moments are profoundly visual, concerned 
with seeing what is there, or, more specifically, authorising the visual. These two issues, it 
transpires, have always historically animated accounts of discretion.  
 
Authorising the visual 
The tradition of discretio spirituum  
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Discretion has several meanings. First, it is the power or authority to decide (in law, for 
instance), as well as the freedom to decide according to one’s will. This sense is separated 
from a second, the faculty of discernment and discrimination, and, third, the action of 
discerning or judging1. The etymon of all of these senses is the Latin discretio. Discretio was 
the translation of the Greek diakrisis (from diakrino), meaning to separate or distinguish, as 
well as to settle, decide or judge (Liddell and Scott 1929: 162). The early western Christian 
use of discretio was influenced by NeoPlatonic ideas about diakrisis as judgement, but it was 
the specific Biblical use of diakrisis which exerted the most formative influence on the 
development of discretio as a concept. In Corinthians, St Paul used diakrisis (translated as 
discretio) to warn about Satan’s power to disguise himself as an “angel of light”. An angelic 
apparition, Paul warned, could actually be a visitation from the Devil, and good Christians 
thus had to separate – to discern – spiritual visions. In other words, post-classical Latin 
equated discretio with discernment as a spiritual and visual faculty. The subsequent tradition 
of discretio spirituum (discernment of spirits) elaborated this idea, combining new religious 
concerns with the much older questions of Greek diakrisis. As Foucault argues, discretio was 
where these ancient questions were “reinserted, reactivated, and taken up again in 
Christianity” (2014: 258) in a way that was to have lasting influence over western thought.  
In the earliest ascetical Christian writings in the third and fourth centuries, then, discretio 
cautioned about the discrepancy between truth and appearance, or put differently, the 
danger than good and evil might appear exactly the same (Copeland and Machielsen 2013: 
2-3). Discretio spirituum warned about the terrible power of the devil, but also asserted the 
visual as a site where divine truth could manifest itself. The visual element of discretio was 
prominent throughout the medieval period, when the concern was how to authorise the 
visions that appeared wholly real to the seer, but might be inauthentic. The work of Jean 
Gerson is emblematic of this era. In 1401, Gerson, then Chancellor of the University of Paris, 
wrote a famous treatise on spiritual discernment (Anderson 2011). He eschewed “proofs that 
could be tested by the senses of others” such as miracles or independently verifiable signs 
(Christian 1981: 192-3). Instead, he placed importance on the seers’ virtues, character and 
emotions, which were interpreted as moral or divine indicators (Christian 1981: 201). 
Problematically, however, Gerson understood virtues to be in practice indistinguishable 
from their vices (the virtue of patience could be obstinacy in disguise, for instance). His 
ultimate argument was that discernment was a matter of faith, not reason, and had to rely 
on experience and intuition, specifically that of Church authorities (Ossa-Richardson 2013: 
236). No rule could ever definitively distinguish truth and falsity. 
The medieval discretio tradition settled uneasily on moral and affective tests of authenticity, 
but never questioned the visual manifestation per se. In the European Renaissance, however, 
discretio spirituum became part of wider debates about the fallibility of vision. The 
                                                            
1 These three meanings are distinguished from discreet, and the senses related to being discrete (or 
separate).   
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development of linear one-point perspective is generally thought to have established a 
rational, logical basis for vision that permeated multiple fields of enquiry (Berger 1972; Jay 
1994). However, Clark (2007) argues that Renaissance and early modern vision was actually 
highly insecure. Illness or madness, for instance, could make people see non-existent things, 
and popular theatrical optical trickery exposed the fallibility of human sight. Discussions 
about discretio reflected this insecurity. If visions, argues Clark (2003: 146-7), “included real 
appearances with a false content and false appearances that were altogether imaginary” – 
then they were no longer simply theological puzzles, but “visual puzzles” too (Clark 2003: 
146-7). So, as well as featuring prominently in battles between Catholicism and the 
Protestant reformers in this period, discretio was one of many areas – the arts, new optical 
sciences – where a culturally-grounded visual relativity was invoked (Clark 2007: 228).  
By the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the visual problems that had previously been 
encompassed by the discretio tradition – Can we trust what we see? Who (with reference to 
what rules) can authorise the visual? – became the problems of an increasingly secular 
philosophy. Hobbes, for instance, dismissed apparitions as confusion about the nature of 
appearance or elements of “daemonological religions” (Clark 2007: 221). Descartes, too, was 
troubled by the deceptiveness of the senses. His elevation of reason as the foundation for 
judgement and authorising the visual was partly a response to his belief that we cannot trust 
our senses until the existence of a non-deceiving God has been established. But if reason 
proves the existence of God, sensory evidence is safeguarded because we can correct errors 
ourselves (Ossa-Richardson 2013). In short, the new theories of sensation offered by Hobbes, 
Descartes and others in the early modern period made apparitions the subject of mainstream 
philosophical accounts of “appearance” (Clark 2007: 222). Discretio spirituum remained a 
theological issue, as it is today, but the problems of “the reliability of private experience and 
private judgment” (Ossa-Richardson 2013: 235) became encompassed by new secular ideas. 
Vision, aided by new technologies and increasingly free of its sacred functions, became the 
dominant (albeit troubled) sense of the modern (Jay 1994: 45).  
 
Discernment and security: seeing what is there 
It is impossible to do justice to the complex discretio literature in this context. I offer the 
summary as a means of making two points. First, the historical view of discretio as a 
visual/spiritual issue problematizes the ‘discovery’ of discretion in the mid-twentieth 
century (Walker 1993: 6). To be clear, the issues with which discretion is associated in 
contemporary times – applying a legal or policy rule in ambiguous contexts – are obviously 
specific to the modern bureaucratic administration of law and policy. There are no 
straightforward historical comparisons. I am making the case, however, for the legal and 
bureaucratic connotation – which in our times has at its centre the judgement of a reasonable 
liberal subject – to re-admit the wider historical senses from which it emerged. 
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Diakrisis/discretio historically expressed a choice between alternatives, the ability to 
distinguish and discern matters (Rich 2007: 11). Discretion as an activity of judgement was 
and is, in part, a visual problem related to the (literal and metaphorical) difficulty of seeing 
what is there. Second, discretio as discernment refers to the specific desire, within the 
ocularcentric history of the west, to authorise visual truth amidst the “specious comings and 
goings of sensory particulars” (Ossa-Richardson 2013: 256). Put simply, discretio named not a 
decisive resolution via the judicious (non)application of a rule. Instead, discretio 
acknowledged the difficult, provisional nature of any decision.  
What, then, might we learn by viewing contemporary decisions at the data border in light of 
this history of discretion? What if border security practice were not construed in terms of 
automated rules-based risk scoring followed by “rapid and accurate decisions in real time” 
(SAS Analytics 2015), but as an ambiguous visual practice oriented towards an uncertain 
future? At the border targeting centre, the analysis of data was understood in visual terms:  
[I]f you've ever seen a Nigerian passport with a five-year multi-entry visit visa in, it's 
just been concertina stapled together with all the previous Nigerian passports... Even 
a trained immigration officer's going to find it really difficult to work out the travel 
history from passports with countries that stamp in and out, from countries that only 
stamp in, from countries that only stamp out. You get all the data on the screen and 
when does somebody with a very good travel history become somebody with a 
travel history that's really too frequent?  Looking at data like that, you will be able at 
some point to realise, hang on, this guy with a visit visa is spending the majority of 
time in this country, they're not a visitor at all!  (Interview 1) 
Getting the “data on the screen”, then, offered an augmented view of the passenger that 
humans would find impossible. The software developers promise precisely this – the 
collation of “massive amounts of data for a single view of all available relevant information” 
(SAS Analytics 2015). This single view – exposing a travel history, a ‘hit’ against indicators 
with numeric score – is a visualisation of threat attuned to the problem that has haunted the 
post-9/11 security terrain: the terrorist travelling as an innocuous passenger citizen. The data 
promises to see what is really there, giving an authoritative visualisation of the subject to 
enable “instant and confident” judgements in situations where “public security and safety 
needs to be balanced against convenience and cost” (SAS Analytics 2015: 5).  
Data analysis in this sense occupies the space between appearance and truth (the space that 
previous accounts of discretio acknowledged openly) by associating digital traces – a credit 
card transaction, unchecked baggage, a distinctive journey. In this way, the analytics, argue 
Amoore and Piotukh (2015: 343-4), make data intelligible (and actionable) in a way that 
fundamentally alters human capacities to make sense of the world. They are instruments of 
perception, shaping what can be “perceived, known and acted upon” (ibid.: 344). So, in the 
border targeting centre, the visual field of security is narrowed to a particular set of screened 
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hits, with everything else falling away. This is the troubling point: seeing what is there and 
authorising the truth of a subject appears to be devolved to the algorithm, with the occlusion 
of prejudices within “objective” data analysis (Korff 2015).  
Against the history of discretio, however, we can read the analysis of data is a desire for 
certainty via the application of an authoritative rule – a desire that is as fierce, and as 
impossible, as the one embodied in the medieval discretio debates. Important here is Amoore 
and Piotukh’s (2015: 361) argument that analytics produce the “imagination of an infallible 
world”. The political difficulty of the decision – its structure and uncertainty – is obscured 
by a the analytics’ promise to make visible “all human propensities” and render tractable the 
most “turbulent of situations” (ibid.: 361). The responsible decision, in Derrida’s (1994: 39-
40) terms – one that must advance towards a future “which cannot be anticipated” – is 
replaced by “the mechanical application of a rule”. Algorithmic analysis authorises the visual 
in a way that appears to “resolv[e] through knowledge” (Derrida 1994: 37) the difficulties of 
discernment and judgement. As the processor described, “[they] shouldn’t actually be 
taking decisions at all” (Interview 5).      
Yet a focus on the situated practices of the data border are revealing. Their accounts showed 
processors understand the requirement for a decision that is “heterogenous to the 
accumulation of knowledge” (Derrida 1994: 37). Their work is always more than a passive 
retrieval of an algorithmic calculation about a passenger. Take, for instance, the automated 
system’s glitches. Contrary to the promises of software designers, watchlist matching was 
beset by data entry and quality issues. The work becomes a “monotonous, very, very 
boring” (to quote one processor) rectification of the system’s flaws:   
You get what they call numeric validation - ninety one to a hundred. But ninety one, 
what they're saying is it's really not a match… It’s a bit swekiff, that rating system. A 
hundred should be a spot on match, but we get that sometimes when it isn’t… That's 
why they need human intervention. Take date of birth 2-0-0-1, two thousand and 
one, and 2-0-1-1, two thousand and eleven. Yeah, that's on a visa or a date of birth, 
that would say that's a possible match, because there's only one [element] different.  
That’s how it works, it works by the binary side of it.  So there's a lot of crap data in 
there. Half the time you can look at it and go select, select, select, bling, bling, bling, 
because it's all crook. (Interview 8)  
For the processors, the ‘recognition’ of the illegal or suspicious subject via automated 
analysis is always provisional, despite the claim that the data can see what is really there. So 
when the processors described a process of ‘rooting around’ or ‘enriching the hit’, they were 
engaged in a re-visualisation of the life being approximated by the data, using geopolitical 
knowledge, for instance, or immigration or customs expertise. Their field of vision was not 
fully constrained by the algorithmically-generated matches. 
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You might be looking at a target… and you’re looking at the flight manifest and 
you’re looking at Mr Smith, who is a cigarette smuggler and you notice another Mr 
Smith – is that a family member? Let’s just run a check on him. He doesn’t have the 
same travel history as this fellow… actually it’s a lot worse! Why isn’t this guy on a 
watchlist? I suppose this is how intelligence-led crime detection takes place. That 
could be one way of targeting (Interview 3) 
The algorithmic identification of the subject via an “accumulation of knowledge” (Derrida 
1994: 37) is, for the processors, certainly not an authoritative revealing of risk. Their work, in 
the language of Derrida, was to uncover the heterogeneity and contingency of a life between 
the data elements – a different form of discernment. Against the history of discretio that I 
have uncovered, discretion at the data border is not simply the (non)invocation of a rule – 
whether legal, administrative or social (see Ericson 2007) – and the processors 
acknowledged this. Rather it is a profoundly visual practice, a kind of discernment, a matter 
of seeing what is there. The aligning of security attention via the rules-bound automation and 
the discerning eye of the processor are neither wholly separable nor collapsed. 
 
The general and the particular 
Discretio and the rule 
Historically, the discretio literature cautioned against individual decision-making in relation 
to visions (Ossa-Richardson 2013). Appearances were deceitful and human senses were 
untrustworthy: the rule was there could be no rule and deferring judgement was best. For large 
swathes of history discretio meant almost entirely the opposite to modern-day connotations. 
When Gerson described discretio as the ‘daughter of humility’, he was emphasising the 
importance of seeking counsel on all aspects of private revelation (Burrows 1991: 247). This 
deferral of judgement relates to another strand of the history of discretio, one that emphasises 
the virtue of moderation or prudence. Discretio here referred to the avoidance of excess and 
also to the ethical relationship between the general and particular. In this section, I lay out 
this aspect of the history of discretio. 
The early Christian thinking on discretio was developed in texts produced for, and by, monks 
about the ideals of monastic living. Foucault places great significance on the reinvigoration 
of ancient philosophical themes by early Christians and its subsequent influence on western 
subjectivity (2014: 266). He notes (along with many others) the emblematic work of John 
Cassian (360-435 AD), a founder of western monasticism and widely acknowledged as “the 
first theoretician of discretio” (Dingjan cited in Ragazzi 2014: 110). Cassian believed that evil 
spirits could appear externally, in visions, but they were also able to enter the body and soul. 
Discretio was vital not only because Satan and God could appear identical in external signs, 
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but also because there was no absolute way to distinguish Satan and the subject. Cassian’s 
discretio, then, was an external scepticism and vigilant self-examination.  
Foucault is particularly struck by the centrality of obedience and humility to this idea of 
discretio. Novice monks were taught “not to hide with false shame any of the thoughts that 
gnaw at their heart” but “to obey in everything and hide nothing” (cited in Foucault 2014: 
266). The principles of “incessant examination” and “exhaustive confession” could avoid 
two concurrent dangers: laxity and excessive rigor (Foucault 2014: 290). In this sense, the 
Christian theme of discretio-as-moderation appears to revisit the themes of ancient 
philosophy. But Cassian’s meaning was different, argues Foucault. For the ancients, 
determining the difference between too much and too little was owed to logos: the “reason 
he has in himself and that is perfectly clear to his own eyes” as long as he is not confused by 
the passions (Foucault 2014:  294). The ancient philosopher could determine his measure for 
himself. Cassian, conversely, implies that there is “no natural discretion immanent to man” 
(ibid.: 294). What was in question in Christian thought was “not the truth of my idea: it is the 
truth of myself who has an idea” (ibid.: 303). Exercising discretio on oneself meant to 
“decipher the power of illusion and deception” that inhabits me (ibid.: 307). Foucault places 
this centrally in his history of confession and western subjectivity.  
There are two things to emphasise for the purposes of this paper. First, Cassian’s discretio 
was to have a significant influence on the development of western moral thought. In 
identifying discretio as a virtue of measure, Cassian was responsible for “injecting into the 
term the very meaning that would later identify the function of prudence” (Ragazzi 2014: 
110; Rich 2007: 84-85). So, specifically, St Thomas Aquinas’ writings on prudence are known 
to have been heavily influenced discretio, so that prudence  “inherits everything that the 
masters of the spiritual life had stored in this term” Deman (1947: 407-8, cited in Ragazzi 
2014: 144). Second, and more importantly for this paper, the discretio literature describes a 
shifting relationship between judgement, deference and rule. It is important to remember 
here that early monastic ‘rule’ was very different from modern concepts of governing 
precepts or laws. In early Christianity, rule denoted a moral code, or model, for arranging a 
whole way of life (Erickson et al 2013: 39). So, in the Rule of St Benedict (480-547), famously, 
discretio was a quality and virtue of the abbott, who had to display a “fine intuition into his 
subjects’ strengths and weaknesses” (Lienhard 1980: 528). Discernment here was not a visual 
gift or spiritual judgement, but an “ability to see beyond single rules and practices and 
comprehend the total effect of an action”, and to comprehend the “spirit of the rule rather 
than the letter” (Lienhard 1980: 521). Benedict argues that the abbot cannot dispense or 
modify the Rule, but nor “is the rule enough of itself without the Abbott, by reason of its 
abstract and general character” (Delatte 2000: 454-5).  
Agamben (2013) is struck by the significance of this sense of rule. He argues that monks did 
not submit themselves to a particular set of precepts or the will of the abbott in their 
communal life. Rather, they had “as their law the willfullness of their own desires” (2013: 
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12). That is, monastic rules shaped the life of the monks as it was lived, rather than 
providing external boundaries to life through the imposition of prohibitions. For Agamben, 
what is at stake in early monasticism was not the enforcement of norms, but how the monk’s 
form of life creates his rules – how rules and life enter into what he calls a zone of 
indifference. Agamben’s overall argument is that the cenobitic project, by shifting the ethical 
problem from the relation between norm and action to that of a form of life, “calls into 
question the very dichotomy of rule and life, universal and particularity, necessity and 
liberty, through which we are used to comprehending ethics” (Agamben 2013: 72). In the 
context of this paper, what is interesting is how Agamben shows that rule and discretio were 
once not external opposites, but co-constituting. Rule was not an exterior prescription, but 
an ordering of conduct arising from a lived well in discretio.  
 
Separating what is mixed: security and the rule 
Again, this literature is complex and only a summary is possible here. I present the ideas, 
however, to show that discretio – in the sense of “placing oneself in the middle, seeing what 
is too much or not enough” (Foucault 2014: 290) – has been highly influential (yet often 
hidden) in western moral thought. The root, as I have mentioned, is diakrisis, what Foucault 
refers to as the ability to “separate what is mixed” (2014: 290). So, as well as a visual 
discernment, discretio historically captured the importance of “overcoming the schematic” 
(Widnmann cited in Lienhard 1980: 521) and the tension between abstract and specific. 
Modern ideas of discretion and discernment embody the idea of intellectual and ethical 
discrimination. So, when John Locke identified discernment and abstraction as the highest 
forms of mental activity (Ward 2010: 35), he was invoking Plato’s argument that thinking 
about something involves both 'collecting’ and ‘splitting’ (Phaedrus 265 c-e). He was also 
invoking the idea that discernment (diakrisis, discretio) involves seeing that the general idea 
and the particular ideas are not the same. Modern ideas of good ethical judgement also 
invoke the distinction between the abstract and the specific: discretion  came to imply 
precisely the flexible ability to accommodate “different configurations of times, place and 
persons… when precept alone cannot provide an adequate guide” (Patrick 2007: 1). 
Recalling the earlier monastic descriptions of discretio (and the older, ancient themes of 
measure) good judgement requires discretion as the ability to “bring particulars into focus” 
and to isolate “crucial differences between ideas, instances and situations” (Patrick 2007: 13). 
This sense of discretion - the separation of the general and the particular as an ethical 
activity – survives today as the “tailored and humane application of general rules and laws 
to individual cases” (Pratt and Sossin 2009: 307). Contemporary discretion traces the 
relationship between general (rule) and specific (case) by “discovering [a rule’s] meaning, 
characterising the present problem, and judging whether that problem is addressed by the 
rule” (Hawkins 1993: 35). So, discretion means making sense of rules, and making 
(constrained) choices about their relevance and (non)use in distinct situations.  
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This, clearly, is not the division of labour at work in data-led security decisions. First, the 
rules through which we are increasingly governed today – algorithmic rules – greatly 
trouble the historical relationship between general (rule) and particular (case). It is the case 
that some border security algorithms express in code a recognisable set of legal rules, for 
instance the watchlist matching of API data to identify suspects who formally meet the 
criminal legal requirements of “suspect” (Korff 2015: 8). In rules-based targeting, historical 
data generates profiles and rules – smuggling travel patterns, terror risk factors – against 
which new passenger data can be run. Users – like those I interviewed at the border 
targeting centre – generate ‘input tools’ to “say to the system to pick up passengers who are 
travelling from this flight, who have picked their ticket up three days prior to flying, for 
example” (Interview 9).  Watchlist matching and rules-based targeting, however differ from 
what the developers describe as “speculative analytics-based targeting”. This is a form of 
knowledge extraction that relies on the discernment of patterns rather than the application 
of pre-existing rules. It mines data to “reveal patterns in passenger and freight data most 
associated with risk” (SAS Analytics 2015: 13-14). The rules through which a subject is 
targeted are ‘read off’ from life transformed into data.  
This is a troubling kind of diakrisis. The governing rules of our times in places like the border 
targeting centre are not only difficult to understand and hard to recover (see Korff 2015), but 
they are increasingly indistinguishable from life as it is lived. The blurring of life and rule 
appears to resonate with Agamben’s monastic rule. Agamben’s concern is to show that the 
monk’s form-of-life was “a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law” (2015: 
xiii), related to the world by use, rather than ownership. He critiques the neoliberal economic 
order by documenting efforts to be free of law (and its exceptional power) altogether. In the 
contemporary relationship between rule and life in the analytics, however, we see 
something much more disturbing – the impossibility of ever truly separating life and rule. In 
cutting edge analytics, it is no longer quite possible to place limits on what might be 
considered “all available and relevant information sources” (SAS Analytics 2015). An 
exterior governing rule that might be judiciously applied to a particular life is now replaced 
by the algorithmic ‘making discrete’ of a governable subject from his or her dispersed and 
heterogenous data. 
The question becomes, what kind of relationship between general and particular exists in 
data-led security decisions? What kind of discretion (as “overcoming the schematic”) resides 
in contexts like the border targeting centre? The automated process of distinguishing the 
subject must, to work, “substitute differences in kind for differences in degree, collapsing 
qualitative difference into enumeration and action” (Amoore and Piotukh 2015: 350). It is a 
process through which vast swathes of data are discarded to  produce ‘readable’ lives that 
are “flattened and reduced to their common stems” (ibid.: 360, 347) – similar journeys, 
common travel agents, shared credit card transactions. A particular subject of interest is 
made discrete by what he or she shares with others, via clusters of risk and rules of 
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association gleaned from the general. This visualisation says nothing, however, about the 
“curious intangibility” of the singular life (Arendt 1957: 181) behind the data.  
Again, a focus on the situated practices of the data targeting centres is revealing. The 
processors, my interviews show, were very much concerned with the particular and the 
singular. Theirs was a style of enquiry oriented towards what the subject is (what threat does 
she pose?) but also towards who she is (what is the story behind this risk flag?). In many 
ways, their work was the opposite of the classic accounts of discretion: they had to discern 
how and why ‘the rules’ had distinguished the hit.  
I always try to explore every little detail. It drives you mad. If it doesn’t add up or if 
something doesn’t make sense…. Somebody’s gone from Sao Paulo to Madrid, and 
then they’ve gone off to Oz and then they’ve come here. Well, why have they done 
that? I mean that’s an extreme example, but I would always be thinking why have 
they done that? Until I know they work for a company that has bases all over or 
something, it doesn’t sit easy. So, that’s what I always find I’m doing. I don’t know 
what [other team members] do, but I do think that I do go a bit extreme (Interview 
10) 
Somebody who's a frequent traveller on a budget airline to the Mediterranean may 
be a cigarette smuggler, they may be a golfer, they may be an ex-pat. Is there 
anything I see beyond that which might make a call between one and the other? […] 
Because, okay, they're arriving at midnight, and who goes on holiday to arrive at 
midnight, especially when they're travelling with their kids?  Erm, well people who 
want to spend their money in the bar rather than give it to Easyjet, or people who are 
on a business trip and are trying to reduce their margins (Interview 1) 
The discretion at work in the border targeting centre is not the discovery of the meaning of a 
rule, “characterising the present problem, and judging whether that problem is addressed 
by the rule” (Hawkins 1993: 35). Nonetheless, the processors were aware, in their efforts to 
make a judgement call about a discernible life, that there was no “decisive analysis with 
high accuracy” (SAS Analytics 2015). Instead, their experience was an uncertain, intuitive 
and ambiguous effort to “overcome the schematic”. Just as Gerson warned in that “there is 
no general norm […] for distinguishing always and infallibly the revelations that are 
genuine from those that are false and illusionary” (cited in Voaden 1999: 57), so the 
algorithmic rules of border targeting were understood by practitioners to offer only a fallible 
means of distinguishing a risky subject from millions of bits of data.   
 
Discerning people 
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I have shown that viewing discretion along conventional lines – as an individual judgement 
constrained (but also enabled) by legal or policy rules – has little purchase in burgeoning 
contexts of automation. This is because it tends to replicate the strong (and problematic) 
separation of humans and technologies in decision-making. My example has been the data 
border, but the point is more broadly applicable. Viewing discretio in light of its rich history 
– related to problems of authorising the visual and to the (intellectual and ethical) 
relationship between general and particular – enables us to see more clearly how humans, 
rules and technologies are associated within contemporary decisions about security. The 
characterisation of discretion as the property of a visually secure and sovereign rational 
liberal subject, whose relationship to the rule is one of constraint or freedom, choice and 
(non)invocation, hides the tensions that discretio historically acknowledged prominently. 
Despite the desire for (yet ultimate absence of) certainty in what we see and know, a rule for 
discerning truth or authorising judgement “always and infallibly” (as Gerson puts it) is not 
possible.  
My argument is that viewing discretion differently – as a matter of seeing what is there, and 
distinguishing the particular and the general - illuminate contexts where technological 
sophistication, algorithmic complexity and increased automation fast appear to be altering 
human capacities to make decisions about the world. It is, after Aradau and Blanke (2015), a 
matter of “divided labour” within socio-technical relationships. We must be wary of any 
account of the turn to data within security (and elsewhere) which posits a redundant and 
passive human subject within automated algorithmic analytics, but we must also be wary of 
reassurances that it is “humans who still decide”. We must certainly revisit the discretionary 
powers that border agents are said to embody. Paying attention to the situated and 
contingent production of security decisions at the border demonstrate that authorising the 
visual and discerning the particular are shared, uncertain and provisional endeavours, 
whatever the promise of data to see what is really there.   
By way of conclusion, I would like to make two interrelated points. First, discretio has always 
been associated with specific “procedures of subjectivation” (Foucault 2014: 309). For large 
parts of western history, and in complete contrast to contemporary discretion, discretio 
meant not making a decision at all, hesitating in everything, deferring to others to test the 
truth of one’s senses and one’s very self. The subject brought into being by the practices and 
discourses of discretio that Cassian advocated, for example, had to accept that illusion was 
intrinsic to external vision, but also to her innermost life. Retrieving the history of discretio 
simply reinstates the difference between the deferent obedience required by religious 
authorities through swathes of Christian western history, and the self-confident liberal 
subject of modernity, whose reason alone became the foundation for securing vision, 
knowledge and judgement. There are clearly no straightforward analogies to be drawn. 
What the history of discretio reminds us, however, is that each configuration of rule and 
discretio produces different discerning subjects. So, the real question is not whether the rule 
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or judgement holds sway – in our times, this question is widely posed as whether 
algorithms or humans have power in decisions in public life. Rather, the question becomes 
what kind of discerning and discretionary subject – with what kind of qualities and 
capacities – is required by the rule and brought into being through discretion?  
At the border targeting centre, processors frequently described themselves as being not 
responsible in their interactions with technologies. For instance, the most serious infraction 
at the targeting centre was to claim a hit but not process it correctly. The mistake was not to 
miss a suspect travelling into the country (although this was bad) but to fail to conform to 
the expected protocol surrounding dealing with the hit. 
If we completely don’t notice something, then I think we get away with it. But if we 
pick up on something and deal with it wrongly then I think we’d be in big trouble... I 
do think I disseminate the correct information (Interview 8) 
Moreover, the processors described a troubled affective relationship with the automated 
system, one that resonates with accounts produced within media and cultural studies (see, 
for instance, Ash 2015) but which rarely feature in accounts of discretion and decision-
making in contexts of public authority. So, for instance, processors sometimes experienced 
the temporal pace of the system, itself a product of the airline arrivals systems, as stressful 
and anxiety provoking. At other times, conversely, as on night shifts, the data processors 
described a pleasurable ‘plugging into the system’ that was clearly embodied and affective,  
On night shift you can put the ipod on, plough through the matches. I bring my 
slippers in – that gives me a bit of added value to the night shift. It makes night shifts 
comfy. (Interview 12) 
The data is ‘live’ in the sense of having its own rhythm, but live also in the sense of it 
“refreshing itself all the time, and it’s about real people, real flights, you do get a sense that it 
is, you are dealing with more real people than I was expecting” (Interview 5).  
My last point is that despite the growing understanding of the isolated (Turkle 2013), 
distracted (Crary 2013) and distributed (Rotman 2008) subjectivity of our times, we simply 
do not know enough about the ways in which affect, visual capacity and socio-cultural (as 
well as organisational) understandings of ‘decision’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘judgement’ are 
under revision in contexts of data-inflected public authority and power. This point is 
pressing in border contexts – as Côté-Boucher (2016: 64) argues, scant attention has been 
paid to “the impact of organisational instability and technological change on border officers’ 
discretion”. The issues are wider, however, given the growing questions about 
accountability in contexts of public and legal administration, where so much of ‘the 
decision’ appears to have been folded into an algorithmic process. How does the 
relationship between current technologies and the plasticity of human cognition, attention 
(and judgement) manifest itself in administrative contexts of law, policy and public 
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bureaucracy? With the diffusion of technologies into everyday decisions about how we are 
to be governed  - from policing and finance, border security and health - the outline of the 
discretionary decision-maker is in flux, even if the problems of discretion as I have described 
them are perennial.     
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